Bahrain Mirror (Exclusive): After all that has emerged, what is hidden of Hamad bin Isa's issues with the people of Bahrain is far worse. The testimonies of those who have met him, aired in the second part of Al Jazeera's What's Hidden is Worse film (Ma Khafiya A'adham), exposed his hostile attitude towards his people, and his insulting language and subversive rhetoric.

Ali Al-May', one of the leaders of the Qatar coup in 1996, spoke of his participation in a secret meeting headed by Hamad bin Isa around three months after the failure of the coup. He says, "Hamad bin Isa asked us to contribute to any bomb attack. He told us, he has a group [in Bahrain] - referring to the Shia- driving him crazy. ‘Why don't you act like them, do something that would disturb the authorities,' he said."

Fahd Al-Maliki, one of the main figures in the coup attempt, talked about the then Bahrain Crown Prince's instigation. He said Hamad bin Isa urged him to carry out acts of sabotage in preparation for a second coup attempt. He also talked about a secret plan between him and Hamad bin Isa, during a meeting at the Government Palace. He told him, "Why don't you create an opposition. Create an illusory opposition group in the media that would distress the government, and in order to reveal the name of the opposition you have to carry out an act of sabotage. You can blow up gas cylinders as the Shiite opposition does in Bahrain." He then specified seven targets for the bombings, including the Passport and Intelligence compounds. He handed him 100,000 Bahraini dinars in cash, equivalent to one million Qatari riyals, and told him to wait for his signal through the liaison officer Mohammad Jaber Al-Muslim. Not only did he do all that, he also granted the leader of the coup cell Hamad bin Jassim bin Hamad a diplomatic Bahraini passport.

Hamad bin Isa was very motivated to make this coup succeed, as if he was carrying out a personal vendetta. There are no political objectives that would justify this insane motivation. The only justification is his numerous psychological complexes linked to inferiority, jealousy, and failure, as a result of a historical imbalance in the relationship between his ruling family and their people, inferiority in the relationship with the other sheikhdoms in the Gulf, and the lack of prominancy that led him to resort to the power of the monarchy in compensation for the lack in his personality.

To understand the context of Hamad bin Isa's direction of this coup, let us recall what was taking place at the level of the opposition in Bahrain in the year which the coup was planned. Was the Bahraini opposition merely a rogue mob that blew up gas cylinders? Was the Bahraini opposition, who at the top of their agenda of demands had the reinstatement of the Constitution and Parliament of 1973, just a nominal group?

On April 24, 1995, the Bahraini opposition leadership announced from inside prison an initiative that comprised a comprehensive vision for ending the political crisis in a way that would spare the country further tension. After negotiations with then Interior Minister Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, Sheikh Hassan Sultan (currently accused of spying for Qatar) was one of those behind the initiative, along with the late Sheikh Abdul Amir Al-Jamri, Mr. Abdul Wahab Hussein (prisoner), Mr. Hassan Mushaima (prisoner) and Sheikh Khalil Sultan.

The initiators committed themselves to calm the public after their release, but the government refrained from fulfilling its commitments; i.e. to release all detainees and implement political reforms. Six months after the initiative, the five men announced (October 20, 1995) the failure of the initiative before being re-arrested.

At the time, the Crown Prince wanted to export his destructive experience to his neighbors to make everyone sink into the swap to which he subjected his country and people. The former US ambassador to Doha, Patrick Theros, was well-versed when he summarized the transition experience in Qatar, by saying: If change hadn't took place in Qatar, it would have remained worse than Bahrain.

We can now explain to the world the difference in Bahrain between an opposition that is committed to the fundamentals of peaceful political action and an authority that has the experience of fabricating illusory dissent and plotting subversive agendas. We can now clarify to them why achieving a solution in Bahrain is almost impossible with an authority that has more experience in subverting governments than building a state.

Arabic Version